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Abstract: Media representations of Muslims in Britain have often disappointed both faith practitioners
and scholars. Imputed failings include distorting beliefs or practices, essentialising the faith, and
amplifying voices that are not representative of Islam. This last factor hinges on questions of authority:
what journalists and Muslims recognise as authority can differ in important ways. Drawing on studies
of journalism practice, prior professional experience, and ethnographic fieldwork and qualitative
interviews in Scotland, I discuss the conventional preference among journalists for “official sources”
and the problems this can present in terms of hierarchy in Islam. I contrast this with a less-studied
imperative, also present in newsrooms, for “real people”. This category matches well with Islam’s
decentralised tradition and presents an opportunity to understand how different kinds of sources
are presented in media coverage. It is possible for journalists to ensure that these differing claims to
authority are represented properly, though this requires knowledge and responsibility.
Keywords: Muslims in Britain; authority; journalism; journalist-source relations; representation; civic
journalism; qualitative methods
1. Introduction
Authority is characterised in part by its audience; therefore, authority is relational. Gudrun
Krämer and Sabine Schmidtke examine authority in their edited volume Speaking for Islam
(Krämer and Schmidtke 2006), and they open with a pair of questions that indicate a shift in audience
relevant for this article:
Who speaks for Islam? Who explains to Muslims whether human rights are a legitimate
concept ‘in Islam,’ whether there is such a thing as ‘Islamic values’ and what they
consist of, and whether violence can ever be justified from a religious point of view?
(Krämer and Schmidtke 2006, p. 1)
The first question engages the subject—the one invested with authority—but leaves its audience
open: the preposition “for” indicates “on behalf of”. It is only in the second question that the
preposition defines this audience: the one with authority is explaining things “to Muslims”, narrowing
the addressee to members of the religious community. Authority is thus exercised to articulate the
limits of proper belief and practice to the community for which such limits are meaningful.
I am, however, interested in a broader addressee for the first question. Who is authorised to speak
for Islam to the wider public, which does not necessarily consider itself Muslim? What this audience
desires is not instruction on religious propriety that it can accept or reject for its own life. Rather, it
wants information to help it understand an external phenomenon, often but not always with an edge
of accountability. “Speaking for Islam” can thus become “answering for Islam”, and journalists are
often the primary audience through which the wider public is addressed.
The topics that Krämer and Schmidtke suggest Muslims might want explained, such as rights,
values, and the justification of violence, are those journalists want explained as well. Studies on
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the representation of Islam and Muslims in Western news media have proliferated since the attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001 (Poole 2002; Richardson 2004;
Moore et al. 2008; Baker et al. 2013; Bleich et al. 2015). Kerry Moore and colleagues studied a sample of
UK coverage of Islam from 2000 to 2008 and found that two thirds of the stories focused “on Muslims
as a threat (in relation to terrorism), a problem (in terms of differences in values) or both (Muslim
extremism in general.” (Moore et al. 2008, p. 3). These preoccupations inform the questions for which
journalists expect someone from within Islam to be answerable.
Muslims, in turn, argue that this coverage misrepresents Muslims and focuses on sensational
topics, employing language that distorts, obscures, or willfully harms Muslims. Social research
identifies dissatisfaction among British Muslims with media narratives (Samad 1998; Kabir 2010;
Ali and Hopkins 2012; Al-Azami 2016). Even among sources who speak with journalists and contribute
to news coverage, the primary word characterising that coverage is “negativity” (Munnik 2018). Muslim
organisations in the UK are now countering this narrative: Muslim Engagement and Development
(MEND) provide resources to equip individual Muslims or community groups to monitor and respond
to media coverage (Muslim Engagement and Development n.d.); an informal monitoring campaign on
social media has evolved into the Centre for Media Monitoring (Subramanian 2018; Muslim Council of
Britain 2018).
Part of the problem is owing to different expectations of journalism. Philip Schlesinger
(Schlesinger 1980) noted a wry response from journalists to his ethnography of BBC newsrooms
in the 1970s, indicating that sociologists hold journalism to a different, even in their view impractical,
standard. Barbie Zelizer (Zelizer 2013), herself a journalist before becoming a scholar, has identified
poor communication and mistrust between the academy and the institution of journalism. As well,
scholars have argued that the UK media has been a significant carrier of Islamophobia, whether
incidentally or deliberately (Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia 1997; Saeed 2007;
Ogan et al. 2013).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to address all of the suggested failings of journalistic coverage
of Islam and Muslims. I examine one source that accounts for some of this dissatisfaction: sourcing
and the representation of authority—who is made to speak for, or answer for, Islam. John Richardson
found that in his survey of British broadsheet representations of Islam, sources whom he classes
as “illegitimate (‘terrorist’) organisations are the most frequently quoted Muslim primary source”,
amplified to the detriment of Muslims who are not terrorists and who might criticise violent activities
(Richardson 2006, p. 112). In Salman Al-Azami’s study of religion in the media, his focus group of
Muslim audiences gave “the overwhelming view . . . that the media . . . promoted hate preachers like
Anjem Chowdhury [sic] (of Al-Muhajiroun) in such a way that they represented the views of all the
Muslims in the world.” (Al-Azami 2016, p. 131). Both scholars and “everyday Muslims” question the
representativity of the sources journalists choose when reporting on Muslims in Britain.
How journalists understand source authority and what expectations they have of sources differs
from authority within Islamic structures. In the following two sections, I review the literature—first
from journalism studies, paying attention to alternative programmes defined as public or civic
journalism and considering whether their incorporation of more diverse sources offers a different
model for evaluating authority. I then consider how authority is understood in Islam, including
recent challenges to traditionally conceived authority. In the fourth section, I observe how these
two conceptions manifest among working journalists, drawing on fieldwork conducted in Glasgow,
Scotland. From this, I argue that the bespoke demands of authority in journalism make the presentation
of Islamic authority a challenge, but that journalists have the capacity to frame Islam’s authority
structures within their reporting by making it clear in their stories the ways in which a given source
might be authorised. Though this does not account for deliberate, ideological misrepresentations of
Islam, it provides some tools for improvements within the broader discussion of religious literacy and
responsible journalism (Petley and Richardson 2011).
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2. Source Authority in Journalism
Sources are one of several elements that contribute to the selection and construction of news
stories, as identified in some of the classic newsroom ethnographies of the 1970s and 80s (Tunstall 1971;
Tuchman 1978; Gans 1980; Fishman 1980; Schlesinger 1987). Herbert Gans, writing about US national
news media, suggests that of all such contributing elements, “those governing the choice of sources are
of prime significance” (Gans 1980, p. 281), and Jeremy Tunstall, looking at specialist correspondents
in UK print media, says journalists who report news—“gatherers”, rather than editors or, as he
calls them, “processors”—are “oriented towards their news sources” above any consideration for
audience or rival journalists (Tunstall 1971, p. 30). These observations provide the foundation for
research into journalist-source relations, a key element of the study of media production. Beyond
their relationship to the news makers, source statements and activities provide the stuff of news itself.
Studies have attempted to identify news values to determine what gets covered and what does not
(Galtung and Ruge 1965; Harcup and O’Neill 2001, 2017), but such lists are derived from coverage,
whereas ethnographic production studies are better equipped to assess the processes of news selection.
Richard Ericson and colleagues define news as “a representation of authority. In the contemporary
knowledge society news represents who are the authorized knowers and what are their authoritative
versions of reality.” (Ericson et al. 1989, p. 3). To discuss source authority, then, we must begin by
considering sources themselves. Who are they, and what influence do they have on journalists, their
practices, and the stories that are eventually published?
Gans defines sources as “actors whom journalists observe or interview . . . [and] the most salient
characteristic of sources is that they provide information as members or representatives of organized
and unorganized interest groups, and yet larger sectors of nation and society.” (Gans 1980, p. 80). This
definition is broad enough to encompass a range of sources in terms of their authority, as they can be
but are not necessarily “representatives” and the groups to which they are attached can be “organized
or unorganized”.
Yet both journalists and scholars make distinctions within that range. The typical distinction is
between official and unofficial sources, and these designations are bound up in power and authority.
Gans notes that “[p]owerful or skilled sources know how to make contact with reporters; but many
people—perhaps most—lack this knowledge.” (Gans 1980, p. 125). Those elite few become effective
at advancing the goals and messages of their organisation. Stuart Hall and colleagues call them
“primary definers” who enjoy a “structured preference . . . [to] establish the initial definition” of an
issue or problem in the news media (Hall et al. 1978, p. 58). Journalists, in this analysis, are not
mere ciphers who transmit the views of these powerful groups, but they do reproduce these groups’
definitions within the debate. David Miller and colleagues from the Glasgow Media Group similarly
identified this in reporting about AIDS in Britain: various source communities spoke to the issue, but
the scholars found “structural inequality between organisations in the field. These inequalities are
the outcome of the financial, institutional and cultural resources available to source organisations.”
(Miller et al. 1998, pp. 123–24). Schlesinger (Schlesinger 1990) recognises the inequality of resources
available to sources, though he rejects the assumption implied in Hall’s “primary definition” that
powerful, official sources have automatic access to the media narratives; rather, he views access to the
news as an accomplishment that sources achieve again and again in the cycle of news.
This characterises the work of source communities to get their messages in the news, but the
relationship is two-way: journalists also contact sources for information or comment, whether or not
those sources want to be in the news. Nonetheless, whom they prioritise for contact is also structurally
supported in favour of official sources. Sociologist Mark Fishman (Fishman 1980) studied the practices
of beat reporters at a California newspaper, noting how the demands on their professional time made
the routines of official sources key to their success. By having particular bureaucratic sources they
could turn to—the city council, the courthouse, the police department—reporters could cover news
efficiently. This information was “right” or factual because of its connection to the governmental
and state authorities: for a police spokesperson to say a certain individual was charged with a crime
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was correct because the police had done the charging; for a courthouse spokesperson to say that
individual was found guilty was correct because the judge had convicted her. The material was trusted
because it was true and efficient because it was easy, and so this reliance on official sources became
routinised; Oscar Gandy, in a separate but contemporary study, calls such routines “information
subsidies” (Gandy 1982). Official sources become, in Fishman’s useful phrase, “socially authorized
and socially sanctioned knowers” (Fishman 1980, p. 95), distinct from non-bureaucratic sources who
cannot benefit from the assumption of the facticity of what they say.
Just as journalists can become socialised into prioritising official sources, scholars can imagine
such source relations to be the only ones that matter. In his critique of media production research,
Schlesinger finds that “[e]mpirical studies . . . have largely failed to investigate the forms of action
adopted by non-official sources.” (Schlesinger 1990, p. 76). We see this absolutism in the introduction
to Ericson and colleagues’ comprehensive study of crime reporting in Canada in the 1980s:
It is hard to imagine a mainstream newscast or newspaper that cites only the man on the
street, the cop on the beat, the hospital porter, the House of Commons backbencher, the
university student, and the clerk of the court. It is thus easy to see why they must cite the
executive in his office, the chief of police, the hospital administrator, the cabinet minister, the
professor, and the chief justice. These are the people who are recognized socially to be in a
position to know. (Ericson et al. 1989, p. 4)
This thought experiment, with the ring of common sense, yields to a naturalistic fallacy. Their
rhetoric overstates the case: the word “only” in their first sentence presents a straw man. No one would
suggest that news reports “only” focus on everyday workers or other non-official sources. Such reports
would lack due attention to the big picture and to events and decisions of communal importance.
Ericson and colleagues tell us that journalists “must” include official sources, but we could easily
imagine the converse in which news reports “only” publish such voices. Advocates of public or civic
journalism, as we see below, criticise reports of this kind as out of touch with the public and limited to
a narrow, bureaucratic definition of what matters in society. Similarly, Fishman noted that journalists
with a particular beat or specialism might learn things outside the bureaucratic system, such as crime
reporters receiving victim or witness testimonies. Yet they hold off reporting such accounts until the
events have manifested in the bureaucratic system—a suspect is charged or appears in court. Until
such authorised knowers validate the information, it is “officially invisible” (Fishman 1980, p. 76).
More- or Less-Official Sources and “Real People”
The binary pairing of official and unofficial or non-official sources makes, I believe, too blunt
a delineation. Paul Manning defines official sources as those “associated with the apparatus of
government and the state”; everyone else is, therefore, unofficial (Manning 2001, p. 140). This
restriction ignores the authorisation that comes from being a representative body or holding capital,
especially financial capital. Thus the chief executive officer of an international bank—the kind of
source Ericson and colleagues would recognise as authorised knowers—sits uncomfortably within
the category of “unofficial sources.” I suggest that Manning’s state associations are better classed as
“bureaucratic,” a term which features repeatedly in Fishman’s study of news routines. Journalist
and linguist Allan Bell considers this designation as a threshold of activity: non-bureaucratic sources
typically need to be doing something in order to make the news, whereas authorised bureaucratic
sources can accomplish things by saying them: “Talk is news only if the right person is talking.”
(Bell 1991, p. 131; cf. Austin 1975).
David Deacon has noted further that in the sphere of voluntary organisations, to which he
accords unofficial status, we can still find a range from “small community-based groups operating on a
financial shoestring to large, highly professionalized, international organizations controlling millions
of pounds.” (Deacon 1996, p. 176). Robert Hackett (Hackett 1985) proposed a “hierarchy of access”
which demonstrates this unequal distribution of power in a fine-grained ranking, demonstrating not
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only the greater access and influence of bureaucratic sources but the various uses to which the source
types are put. Binary oppositions, then, are insufficient for analysing the distribution of power among
journalists’ sources. In its place, I propose applying a spectrum of more- or less-official sources, making
the conditions of each source a matter of empirical study.
Beyond the spectrum of more- or less-official sources, there are truly unofficial sources. Informed
by both scholarship and my prior professional practice, I refer to such sources as “real people”.1
Research on this topic is sometimes embedded in assessments of what is called civic or public journalism
(Glasser 1999; Rosen 1999). The movement “celebrates the absence of clear and precise definitions,”
but in its various expressions, it attempts to bring institutional journalism closer to the interests, and
in many cases the voices, of the people (Glasser 1999, p. 5). Results concerning sources are mixed:
Brian Massey (Massey 1998) found numbers of “non-elite” sources in civic journalism experiments
increased, but their prominence in stories did not; David Kurpius (Kurpius 2002), however, found that
civic journalism practices did improve the diversity of sources. Joyce Nip ventured a list of the broad
qualities and preoccupations of civic journalism, including the practice of “giving ordinary people a
voice,” which includes a reference to “real people”, set off in quotation marks as I do (Nip 2008, p. 180).
Nip conducted an ethnography of a daily newspaper in Savannah, Georgia, to discover whether
the practices of civic journalism were still present in a committed newsroom several years after the
movement was first articulated. Some of these practices had been routinised, but others—especially
“mechanisms of active listening to the community”—were not (Nip 2008, pp. 191–92). “Real people”
also feature as a category of sources in David Kennamer and Jeff South’s comparison of civic and
traditional news coverage of the 2000 election in the state of Virginia (Kennamer and South 2002, p. 43).
More recently, and outside of the US context, where so much of the research on civic journalism
has taken place, scholars have noted how technology has increased the presence and prominence
of “ordinary people” in Belgian newspapers (De Keyser and Raeymaeckers 2012). A team of Dutch
scholars concurred but determined that this presence was largely through the use of “vox pops” and
thus not a substantive contribution to the news (Kleemans et al. 2015). Zvi Reich’s (Reich 2015) study
of sources in Israeli news similarly shows a negligible contribution from “ordinary citizens”.
Journalists using the term “real people” are distinguishing a type of source from those with an
agenda or a bureaucratic role. Andrew Garbett and colleagues, in evaluating how BBC journalists in
London recruited sources from the community, quote one journalist who wanted “‘a real people file’”
in contrast to “‘the expert file’”: such sources made news “more engaging,” but their non-institutional
character made them difficult to identify and recruit (Garbett et al. 2014, p. 5). They are conceived of
as ordinary people to whom things happen or who do particular things that express wider stories in
the community. The more organised a group becomes, the less inclined journalists are to consider its
members “real people”: Garbett and colleagues note that even “citizen journalists” such as bloggers
did not fit their participants’ definition of “real people”, though they were imagined as a potential
conduit to such sources (Garbett et al. 2014, pp. 5–6). To the extent that journalists fear the intrusion of
“spin” (Sumpter and Tankard 1994; McNair 2004), “real people”, in an ideal sense, do not spin stories:
they are honest, and they merely relate a narrative from their experience. The quality of honesty
allows “real people” to function, for journalists, as a kind of Everyman to which the putative audience
connects as it cannot a politician, a committee chair, or an academic expert. “Real people”, then, can be
understood as a counter-trend to the reliance on bureaucratic or more-official sources.
1 For eight years, I worked in public broadcasting in Canada. The newsroom I worked in adopted a public journalism
campaign in the mid-2000s, conducting demographic analysis of the city, comparing this analysis with the categories of
voices present in our coverage, and actively cultivating source relationships with categories that were absent from that
coverage (Munnik 2016). Even prior to this experiment, producers insisted on the use of “real people” as a valuable addition
to stories.
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3. Authority in Islam
Authority in Islam starts with the Prophet Muhammad, who embodies, in some ways, an archetype
of Max Weber’s idea of charismatic authority (Weber 1968). The question facing early Muslims was
how to effect this authority after his death. On the one hand, the revealed scripture provides a large
measure of guidance: the Qur’an is full of instruction. Furthermore, the sunna or the example of
the Prophet gives clarity to the prescriptive nature of Islam. The sayings of the Prophet and stories
attributed to him begin an interrogative process of authority, by which Muslims ask for answers
concerning what God wants of them in a specific circumstance.
These bodies of knowledge, however, do not speak for themselves, and so the interpreting
community becomes an additional source of authority. As Krämer and Schmidtke write, “[t]o deal with
the Qur’an and sunna not just as a source of moral guidance but as normative textual proof regulating
human activity in all spheres of life requires expert knowledge, a knowledge premised on a minimum
level of literacy and the requisite training” (Krämer and Schmidtke 2006, p. 5). The authorisation of
individuals is a social process, contingent and developing. Authorising one version closes down another,
and competition for primacy characterised the early period of the formation of Islam (Berkey 2003).
Hamid Dabashi, following the Orientalist scholar Montgomery Watt, perceives that “‘[o]rthodox’ and
‘heterodox’ are polemical, not hermeneutic terms” (Dabashi 2002, p. 71). Dabashi considers different
solutions to the continuation of Muhammad’s authority and the correct interpretation of scripture that
jostled for legitimacy in the first years after the Prophet’s death; these would develop, in time, to what
we recognise as Sunni and Shi’ite positions, as well as a broad envelope of approaches and doctrines
collectively classed as Kharijite. Rather than taking a theological position on the correctness of one
branch or another, Dabashi looks urges us to look sociologically at “the particular position that they
maintain vis-à-vis Muhammad’s charismatic legacy.” (Dabashi 2002, p. 72).
The two expressions that comprise the majority of Islam globally have formalised and routinised
their positions. Underpinned by the fundamental insistence in Islam on tawhid or the oneness of
God, these structures give a certainty and rigidity to the interpretations of the authorised interpreters.
Infallibility is attributed in Shi’ite Islam to the Imams, given additional political expression in current-day
Iran through the doctrine of velayat-e-faqih (Amirpur 2006); for Sunnis, it is manifest in the idea of
consensus of scholars or ulama (Berkey 2003; Zaman 2006). Yet rigid authority is not the only ingredient
in effective authority: Dabashi writes that “[n]o claim to authority, in its bid to offer a superseding
culture, can survive without a built-in remissive motif that gives the interdictory motif flexibility and
thus authority.” (Dabashi 2002, p. 154). For the more centralised Shi’ite structures, this flexibility comes
from the mystical, hidden knowledge ingredient in the Imam’s authority (Robinson 2009, p. 341). For
Sunnis, the diffusion of authoritative interpretation across four schools or madahib has fostered “[t]he
plurality of Islamic thought” over time and context (Bano 2018a; for practical examples of this, see
Zaman 2002). This mixture of rigidity and flexibility has allowed Islamic authority to endure and
adapt over fourteen centuries, mutable political environments, and global migration.
Scholars have identified a new set of figures claiming religious authority within Islam, outside
the traditional structures. Technology has driven this change—first through the development of print
and now through the spread of digital media. Historian Francis Robinson (Robinson 1993) identified
print as a disruption to the typical method of transmitting knowledge in Islam: the primacy on oral
transmission, memorisation, and the ijaza as the certification of a scholar’s knowledge are part of
the routinisation described above. Print was adopted late in South Asian Muslim societies, for the
purpose of defending against colonialism, and it fostered three religious changes there: what he
calls “Islamic protestantism”, or a sense of the sufficiency of accurate scriptural knowledge; a wider
ummatic consciousness; and “the erosion of the authority of the ulama as interpreters of Islam.”
(Robinson 1993, pp. 242–44). Books could be consulted and interpreted by, as it were, “real people”:
in Robinson’s memorable phrase, “any Ahmad, Mahmud or Muhammad could claim to speak for
Islam.” (Robinson 1993, p. 245). Peter Mandaville considers this in the context of transnational Muslim
communities in late-twentieth and early twenty-first century Britain, where the increase of digital media
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has “fragment[ed] traditional sources of authority such that the locus of ‘real’ Islam and the identity of
those who are permitted to speak on its behalf become ambiguous.” (Mandaville 2001, p. 176). John
Esposito and Dalia Mogahed (Esposito and Mogahed 2007), interpreting the findings of a global Gallup
poll among Muslims following 9/11, take this to the extreme: the title of their book asks Who Speaks for
Islam? The subtitle, What a Billion Muslims Really Think, implicitly answers, “everyone.”
Muhammad Qasim Zaman is quick to discourage us from exaggerating this erosion: the ulama
have proved capable of adapting to technological changes, with both the early adoption of print and
more recently, as with the example of alimYusuf al-Qaradawi, the Internet (Zaman 2002, 2006). Yet there
emerges the challenge of what is called the “new Muslim intellectual” (or “Islamist new intellectual”
or “Muslim activist intellectual”; see Roy 1994; Abu-Rabi’ 1996; Eickelman and Piscatori 1996;
Esposito and Voll 2001; Kersten 2011). In contrasting their status with the rationalised ulama, scholars
note that these figures are “Sufi shaykhs, engineers, professors of education, medical doctors, army and
militia leaders, and others” (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, p. 131; cf. Cesari 2004, p. 115). However,
while this range of backgrounds can serve tacitly to derogate these scholars, the characterisation can
occlude the depth of their study and knowledge base—a base that is not restricted, however, to Islamic
tradition but also “Western civilisation, now so freely made available by print, to find answers to
contemporary challenges.” (Robinson 1993, p. 246). This recourse to a wide base of knowledge and the
need to address contemporary challenges distinguishes what authority is increasingly seen to demand.
Masooda Bano attempted to capture both sides in her recent project studying modern Islamic
authority. Her research engaged both traditional institutions that train ulama such as Cairo’s al-Azhar
and the Dar-ul-Uloom in Deoband (Bano 2018a) as well as newer institutions and scholars in
non-Muslim-majority contexts such as Zaytuna College and Ebrahim College, Hamza Yusuf and Tariq
Ramadan (Bano 2018b). For Bano, authority in Islam is derived from three sources: knowledge of Qur’an
and sunna, or ilm; the moral authority of the scholar, or adab; and their ability to relate to the realities of
the current context (Bano 2018a, pp. 30–31). It is this third quality, Bano argues that contributes to
the increased prominence of these new Muslim intellectuals, though she agrees with Zaman that this
does not necessarily mean ulama are irrelevant or failing to adapt to this new environment. However,
she notes that the “primary audience” of these new leaders are “university-educated Muslims” living,
working, and studying in the West, who are trained to recognise arguments that speak to and reflect
their context (Bano 2018b, p. 25).
This attentiveness to audience returns to the point with which I opened this essay, namely that
authority is relational and is conditioned by the addressee. Krämer and Schmidtke note that “it is
the willingness of others to credit any given person, group or institution with religious authority that
ultimately renders it effective.” (Krämer and Schmidtke 2006, p. 2, emphasis original). Mandaville,
reflecting on British Muslims apart from the Muslim-majority context from which so many came, writes
that “[s]ources of social authority are received and understood in a variety of ways by a given political
community, and often this reception will be dependent on where they (community and authority)
are located within the social discourse of a particular time and place. Social authority is hence never
immutable.” (Mandaville 2001, p. 80, emphasis original). As we shall see, this can create challenges for
journalists who are presented with authority that is not fixed or stable, and these journalists will often
lack the training to recognise how these authorities are being received by their political communities.
One final point on the religious and social authority of Islamic leaders needs addressing here,
and that is the role of the imam in the contemporary UK context. Jocelyne Cesari identifies a range
of leadership types in twenty-first century Islam, and one telling figure is not the “new Muslim
intellectual” described above but what she calls the “parochial leader” (Cesari 2004). This type, Cesari
finds, has superseded the “bureaucratic leader” who represented diasporic Muslim communities by
maintaining links with the Muslim-majority countries from which these people migrated in the second
half of the twentieth century. Parochial leaders “are similar to Catholic priests or Protestant pastors,
who have traditionally derived their authority from the local parish.” (Cesari 2004, p. 127). Imams
take—or are given—a central role in affairs surrounding the mosque for which they have responsibility
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and the Muslims who come for worship and community activities. Unlike imams in Muslim-majority
contexts, who are more like civil servants and have prescribed activities, such a leader “is imam, cadi,
mufti, and teacher all at once; he presides over burials, represents the community in official ceremonies,
and so on. The list of his roles both within and without the religious community is potentially endless.”
(Cesari 2004, p. 130). Though participants in my study suggested “the imam” did not hold such
responsibility in Britain, we shall nonetheless see how this construction of authority conditions ways
of thinking about representative leadership.
4. Source and Authority in Reporting Islam: A Fieldwork Example
I conducted research between August 2012 and March 2014 in Glasgow, Scotland, using interviews
and participant observation to examine relations between journalists and sources in the construction of
news about Islam and Muslims. Part of my project inquired into how journalists conceived of Islam as
a subject and Muslims as sources of or part of the content within their reports. It is from these data that
I derive my insights into the question of how journalists understand authority.
Out of thirty interview participants, twelve were journalists. Three others were classed as sources
but either had occupied journalistic roles previously or had some measure of news work at the time
of my study; to the extent that they spoke in our interviews “as journalists”, I have included their
insights on sources. They worked for a range of mainstream news organisations in both print and
broadcast, tabloid and broadsheet, and occupied both reporter and editor roles. One of the journalists
identified as Muslim. My sampling was purposive, seeking to include journalists who had reported on
Islam or Muslims at some point in their career. Participation in the study was voluntary, and due to
the public nature of their work, I offered to either disclose or anonymise their identity, as they wished.
Anonymised participants are given descriptive, general titles, though I have tried as much as possible
not to identify any of the participants, as it is irrelevant to this analysis.
During our interviews, I asked specific questions about Muslim sources they spoke with; I also
asked about stories they had worked on or might consider as newsworthy, and some source types were
generated from these answers. I transcribed the interviews—verbatim for those I had recorded and in
summary form for the others—and coded these transcripts. From this, I developed a list of Muslim
sources in the journalistic ecosystem of Glasgow and Scotland. The list includes both individuals and
groups or institutions, specific sources and generalised types, and actual and hypothetical sources.
4.1. More- or Less-Official Sources and Authority
All but one of the specific sources in Table 1 would be classed as more- or less-official (I discuss
Faiza Amjid below). They are organised and unorganised interest groups or representatives thereof,
following Gans’s broad definition. Politicians such as Humza Yousaf and Soriya Siddique, and
councillors generally, have bureaucratic authorisation to make things happen. Others, such as lawyer
Aamer Anwar and charity director Robina Qureshi, have authority within their professional roles.
Few, however, occupy an explicitly religious position. None of the specific or general sources is an
alim, and none of the journalists in my study even mentioned the word. Some of the named sources
could be described, as one journalist did, as “Muslim commentator”, but their authority derives more
from their articulateness and identification with Islam than any religious training: Abdel Bari Atwan is
a journalist (in London, not Glasgow), and Azeem Ibrahim positions himself as a policy consultant,
though he has written about Islamic extremism and the Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar. Institutions
such as Radio Ramadhan, Amina, and the Muslim Council of Scotland offer support for a religiously
defined community, though the work of the latter two often encompasses social and political matters.
Similarly, Osama Saeed was for a time a spokesperson for the Muslim Association of Britain and the
Scottish-Islamic Foundation, which took on social and political advocacy for Muslims. I would not
class any of these sources as “new Muslim intellectuals” of the kind described above: they do not
activate any religious authority, though they may be called upon by journalists to answer for Islam, as
I discuss below. Following the terminology from Stephen Jones and colleagues, such sources have
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“standing” in terms of esteem and a social role but not “authority” in a specifically religious sense
(Jones et al. 2015, pp. 216–18). It is also worth noting that these sources represent an expansion of
source diversity from Richardson’s earlier study, notable for its “relative absence of authoritative
sources” who were Muslim (Richardson 2006, p. 113); his list, of course, derives from a content study,
whereas my list comes from interview data.
Table 1. Muslim sources mentioned by journalists in Glasgow, Scotland.
Specific
Sources—Groups/Institutions Specific Sources—Individuals Generalised Types
AMINA—Muslim Women’s
Resource Centre Faiza Amjid
Allison Street residents and shop
owners
Awaz FM Aamer Anwar Councillors
East Renfrewshire mosque group Abdel Bari Atwan Informal networks
Feed Glasgow Azeem Ibrahim Mrs. Gupta/Mrs. Gandhi 1
Glasgow Central Mosque Robina Qureshi Muslim women who do or do notwear the veil
Govanhill Baths Community Trust Osama Saeed Second- or third-generationMuslims
Govanhill Housing Association Soriya Siddique The imam
Muslim Council of Scotland Humza Yousaf The mosque
Radio Ramadhan Women converts
Young people breaking Ramadan fast
at McDonald’s
Younger generation who understand
how media work
1 Items in italics are hypothetical sources.
Several journalists referred to “the mosque” and “the imam” as a general category, with some also
discussing specific communities: the Glasgow Central Mosque and a group attempting to establish
a mosque in East Renfrewshire, a suburb of the city. Several of those participants suggested “the
mosque” was insufficient for and “the imam” not interested or not able to meet journalists’ needs. Two
participants caricatured journalists “going to the mosque” or “ringing up the imam” for comment:
the former was pitched as a kind of low-hanging fruit, suggesting that their less informed colleagues
associate Islam with religion, determine the mosque as “where Muslims go to pray,” and think no
further about where and how to access Glasgow’s Muslims. The typical imam was presented as too
old (“80”), unversed in English, and not inclined to give any comment to the press anyway. For some,
the mosque in general, or the Glasgow Central Mosque in particular, was out of touch with real
Muslims, real attitudes, or real events. The East Renfrewshire mosque group was classed as a good
story, though a difficult one to tell: one journalist used ideal types to describe it, referring again to
the “poor 80-year-old guy” whose “English is poor” and will not speak on the record. The second
type he invoked is “the younger set—guys in their forties, fifties, sixties, born in the UK”. These
sources were deemed good for information but ultimately not useful because of their reluctance to be
quoted publicly.
This set of descriptions contrasts with Cesari’s depiction of the imam as a parochial leader who
accomplishes a range of authorised tasks for Muslims within their notional parish. I attribute some of
this attitude to a desire to appear knowledgeable and current in the interview context: some of the
journalists may have wished to position themselves as better than others in the industry when speaking
with a university researcher on Islam. The role of the British imam has changed significantly, and
more research is needed to capture this professional figure. In time, findings may trickle down to the
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consciousness of working journalists. It is also the case, though, that the parochial frame does not reflect
the kind of authority these journalists were interested in. One journalist put it to me that “the faith has
no phone.” He was demonstrating knowledge of Islam’s non-hierarchical and decentralised structure.
Another mentioned colleagues asking why there was no “Muslim pope.” The word “pope” is resonant
for Glasgow’s Christian sectarian context, where the models of Catholicism and Presbyterianism offer
contrasting examples of authority. The Catholic Church is hierarchical: when the archbishop speaks
for Catholics, he does so with some clout, because he is institutionally charged with administering
faith matters in the archdiocese. Even the press officer at the archdiocese is authorised in a particular
way (though see Beaudoin 2012). The Church of Scotland is decentralised: though there is a head office
in Edinburgh, it does not speak “for” the denomination or its members. From what participants told
me, the simplicity of the strong Catholic structure makes it journalistically useful.2
Structurally, Islam resembles Presbyterian decentralisation. Yet some sources from some Muslim
groups in the city do position themselves as spokespeople. This is the context in which one journalist
told me about “the younger generation, who understand how media work”, mentioned on Table 1. He
said these sources tired of what they perceived as a fumbling articulation of public views from their
elders in the faith and started presenting themselves to journalists, organising voluntary coalitions, and
issuing press releases. This work grew in response to 9/11 (Munnik 2017), when journalistic interest in
Muslims also grew. He said they were careful not to overstate their authority or representativeness,
but they spoke with strength and verve, unafraid of being controversial. Participants compared this
expression of Islam to the Catholic archdiocese leaders, who articulate a clear and controversial view
on moral matters. They suggested that these kinds of sources are better positioned to control the
direction of a story and generate effective and ongoing coverage of an issue.
Thus, out of a familiarity with technology and British media discourse, and responding to a
need from journalists for comment, this category of source appropriates authority. These dimensions
are similar to what scholars have observed in the “new Muslim intellectual” type described above.
Crucially, though, they are not speaking about Islam to Muslims, though they are answering for Islam to
the wider public. As much, for example, as Osama Saeed was invited to rebut statements by Anjem
Choudaryy in the Scottish media, both are elevated to a representative status that may be more useful
for journalists than for Muslims. One journalist spoke of his awareness of the need for caution and
information: “I get the impression that a lot of the people we go to as kind of Muslim leaders are not
viewed as such by lots of Muslims. That makes it hard.” He advocated journalists becoming more
familiar with Muslim communities as a way of improving on that tendency, but he also appealed to
Muslims to make it “a bit more clear” who the satisfactory spokespeople are. The answer, of course,
can be posed as a question: who is satisfactorily representative depends on whom you ask.
4.2. “Real People” and Authority in Islam
Several of the sources listed on Table 1 would be classed as unofficial, or what I am calling “real
people”. They lack the authority markers that officialise them, though they are sought as sources
because of the religious dimension of their activity. All but one are generalised types rather than
specific individuals or groups, and they were a mixture of actual examples that journalists had engaged
for stories, such as “Allison Street residents and shopkeepers” or “women who do or do not wear
the veil”, or hypothetical examples who could be engaged for an imagined story, such as “young
people breaking their Ramadan fast at McDonald’s”. “Mrs. Gupta/”Mrs. Gandhi” is a hypothetical but
concrete construction raised by two different journalists as a counterpoint to an equally hypothetical
2 It is worth noting that the presence of a “Muslim pope” or, less crudely, a phone for the faith, is no guarantee against
negative coverage. Though Catholic leaders in Scotland have a clear and distinctive communication protocol, the church
has nevertheless been embroiled in reports of scandal and negativity (e.g., Deveney 2013); neither are Muslims in Britain
languishing in obscurity and hoping for more presence in the news media. It is the quality, not the quantity, of coverage that
concerns Muslims and scholars alike.
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ethnic Scottish woman. In one case, “Mrs. Gupta” was offered instead of “Mrs. Smith” as a local
shopkeeper who could be included in a story for which the person’s religion was irrelevant. In the
other, “Mrs. Gandhi” was counterpoised with “Mrs. Beattie” in a hypothetical news story that would
not be news at all if it had happened to a white, Christian person. The specific example is Faiza Amjid,
a young Muslim woman commissioned to write an opinion piece on her decision not to wear the veil.
“Women converts” refers to a collection of sources featured by one journalist in profiles for a
tabloid newspaper. These sources were quoted concerning their religious feelings or motivations, but
they are not religious authorities, and the fact of their conversion is not in itself newsworthy enough
to merit the story. One was featured because she was moving with her family to Baghdad in 2004;
another received coverage because he had published a memoir. A qualified exception is the profile of
Gillian Amin, an “ordinary” Scot whose conversion was used as a local example to follow national
news that Lauren Booth, sister-in-law of former prime minister Tony Blair, had converted to Islam.
Though the type “second- or third-generation Muslims” seems similar to the younger generation type
discussed above, the latter has some authority in the way the journalist described it that places it on
the spectrum of more- or less-official sources. The former denotes a “real people” designation which
identifies groups of Muslims who are the children or grandchildren of immigrants. Not all of them
are familiar with media needs and priorities, and this lack of familiarity may in fact make them more
attractive to journalists seeking sources for certain kinds of stories.
As I mentioned above, “real people” have the advantage of being without spin, in the imagination
of journalists. One journalist described a story idea proposed in her newsroom during Ramadan that
was interesting but “too late” to pursue. Ramadan occurred in the summer in 2013, and the journalists
considered school-aged children who might be fasting during the day while taking physical education
classes which would require them to run and be active in an unusually hot summer with no opportunity
to drink water: how were they coping, and what measures might schools take to accommodate them?
I asked how she would have pursued the story if it had been assigned, and the first problem she
described was that of finding sources. After identifying schools with a high population of Muslims,
she would still face the problem of accessing people. She said she could use “official channels,” such as
the mosque or the Muslim Council of Scotland, as conduits; but if she wanted “real people,” she might
devise an elaborate scheme such as visiting McDonald’s restaurant at sunset to “see who turns up.”
Her tone of voice indicated that the “official channels” did not present a satisfactory solution and that
although the trip to McDonald’s was logistically more complicated and did not guarantee finding an
appropriate source, it was her preferred option and worth the effort. What made it worth the effort
was authenticity. Sources arranged by a representative body may have been selected and even coached
on what to say to provide the desired public representation of Islam. “Real people” were depicted as a
guileless alternative.
A second example comes from a journalist discussing the 2007 attack on Glasgow Airport. She
said her organisation struggled with the story: journalists did not “misreport” the story, in that they
got details correct and were prudent in their assumptions about the perpetrators and their connection
to the wider community of Arabs, Asians, or Muslims. However, she said they had none of the added
value of human stories and insights that would come from having “close connections” with the city’s
Muslims. Part of this, she said, was because of the composition of their newsroom: it is hard to get good
Muslim contacts if there are no Muslims working for the organisation. Moreover, a large mainstream
news organisation can be intimidating, and “real people” and “even experts” may be nervous about
commenting on the record. They may not even know how to reach journalists or the newsroom, as
email addresses and phone numbers are not readily accessible to the public.
5. Conclusions
Considering the range of sources identified by journalists in my study, we can see features that
indicate how authority is understood in relation to the production of news about Islam. More- or
less-official sources outweighed “real people” by twenty to seven (the type “informal networks” was
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sufficiently vague to stand outside either category), which squares with the literature that indicates a
journalistic preference for official sources. Yet the majority of the named groups and institutions, though
Muslim, or with responsibility in Muslim communities, are socially authorised to know about things
that are not religious. Journalists would be more likely to call Humza Yousaf, a Member of Scottish
Parliament and cabinet minister in the Scottish National Party’s government, about independence
or, given his secretarial role at the time, foreign policy than the appropriateness of schoolteachers
wearing a niqab. Conversely, the “real people” mentioned were more likely to be contacted because
of the religious dimension of their life and activity—converting, fasting during Ramadan, choosing
to wear or not wear the veil. To the extent that they are socially authorised to know things, it is the
role of religion in their lives that they know. Jeroen De Keyser and Karin Raeymackers identified
this increased authority conferred on “real people” in their Flemish study, calling it “expertise by
experience” (De Keyser and Raeymaeckers 2012, p. 828). Journalists in my sample use them as, in their
parlance, “case studies” to illustrate the event or idea in their stories.
These sources are not trained scholars—neither ulama or Shi’ite Imams nor “new Muslim
intellectuals”, and seldom parochial leaders. Though, as Robinson notes, the transfer of Islamic
learning to print has democratised access to knowledge, the interpretation of that learning still
demands a social context. The apparatus that validates authority in Islam has been shifting, as scholars
in this special issue have identified, but this is concerned with authority that addresses a Muslim
audience. Journalists, seeking answers on behalf of a wider, largely non-Muslim public, are looking for
something else. As the discussion about the preference for hierarchical over decentralised structures
shows, journalists may be more receptive to the rigidity of Islamic authority than its flexibility. This is
consonant with the majority view in scholarship that journalists favour official, authoritative sources.
It means, however, that sources who position themselves thus risk critique from other Muslims that
they are not speaking for Islam—or at least not for “their” Islam.
As I have demonstrated in this paper, journalism and Islam make different demands of authority,
and it is expressed in different ways. The most authoritative voices in Islam are not represented in most
journalistic coverage of the faith, but at the same time, the kinds of questions journalists are interested
in are not always ones they need such sources for. The social challenges of building a mosque in
East Renfrewshire or fasting during hot summer days and school PE lessons do not require expert
knowledge of the Qur’an and sunna or the exemplary conduct of the speaker. Though the best sources
for such a story may not be as forthcoming as the journalists would like, the solution does not lie in the
shifting terrain of Islamic authority.
When the questions move to topics such as rights, values, and the justification of violence, religious
authority is a present concern. My hope with this paper is to indicate the complexity of the question
and the necessity of carefully selecting to whom the journalist gives authority. Journalists need a
little knowledge and some awareness of the sensitivity of the issue, examining not only who presents
themselves as an authoritative voice but how that authority is constructed. Who makes up the political
community activated by the speaker, and what is the social discourse of that particular time and
place? Journalists in this study spoke to me from their occupational and operational perspective;
yet, as scholars, we are able to observe wider patterns concerning sourcing strategies and other
considerations that bear on how news is constructed. Understanding their priorities and how they
justify their actions does not mean we cannot point out the socially problematic consequences they
create. In addition, from within the communities of practice themselves, it may yet be the case that
some British Muslims will criticise those whom journalists choose to answer for Islam on a particular
question. Fourteen centuries of flexibility, growth, and change suggest that this is a normal state of
affairs and one that can be absorbed in the continuum of history.
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